Jaehak Lee

University at Albany · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Health, Applied Micro

Job market paper

Common Ownership and Risk Selection in Medicare Part D

Institutional investors hold equity of multiple Medicare Part D insurers, creating common ownership that may soften competition. This paper examines whether common ownership affects prescription drug plan (PDP) premiums and assess how risk selection interacts with common ownership incentives. By employing non-nested tests and conduct parameter estimates, we demonostrate that premium setting among Medicare Part D insurers are more consistent with common-profit maximization than own-profit maximization. Counterfactual experiments find that the elimination of common ownership would reduce premiums by 20 percents and raise enrollment by 14.7 percentage points. In a scenario without risk selection incentives, the premium reduction from removing common ownership is larger, reaching 25 percents. Overall, our results suggest that common ownership exerts upward pressure on premiums in Medicare Part D market, but such incentive is partially offset by risk selection.