Website CV Paper
Fields
Political Economy, Theory
Job market paper
Strategic Headline Selection
Online news markets separate the headline from the article it represents: the headline circulates freely, while access to the article may require payment. Because many readers consume news through headlines alone, the headline is often the only part of the news they ever see. I develop a model in which a profit-maximizing outlet observes a truthful article, publishes one of its components as the headline, and charges for access to the rest. The outlet selects the component that leaves readers with the most residual uncertainty about the article's conclusion. In equilibrium, this mechanism generates misleading headlines: truthful headlines that induce rational headline-only readers to take actions contrary to those they would take after reading the full article. The model predicts that more informative articles have more informative headlines, that greater internal heterogeneity reduces headline–article alignment, and that this disclosure rule is invariant to whether readership is monetized through subscriptions or advertising. I evaluate these predictions using two corpora comprising more than 440,000 headline–article pairs from major English-language newspapers. A scalable semantic procedure measures informativeness, article heterogeneity, and headline–article alignment. In the cross-section, more informative articles have more informative headlines, while more heterogeneous articles have more specific but less aligned headlines. A difference-in-differences analysis of the 2011 New York Times paywall finds no change in alignment relative to The Guardian. Together, the results identify a source of media bias arising from the truthful but strategic selection of headlines.