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Macroeconomics, Public, Labor, Econometrics
Job market paper
Disability Benefit Reform, Employment and Welfare: Evidence from Australia’s Welfare-to-Work Reforms
Tighter disability-benefit eligibility can generate opposing labour-supply responses: recipients may reduce hours to retain support or increase work when additional earnings are more valuable than continued benefits. We study Australia's Disability Support Pension (DSP), a non-contributory, means-tested payment whose eligibility turns on an hours-based work capacity test rather than on earnings history, and whose recipients have one of the lowest employment rates in the OECD. The 2005 Welfare-to-Work reform lowered the work-capacity threshold from 30 to 15 hours per week from July 2006. Using linked administrative records and a staggered difference-in-differences design, we find that earnings fall upon exposure and employment declines subsequently. Continuing recipients experience persistent losses, while those who exit initially earn more but their gains diminish over time. A calibrated lifecycle model with disability risk and means-tested benefits clarifies these competing incentives. At benchmark prices and unchanged taxes, the tighter hours rule reduces labour supply, lifetime consumption, and entrant welfare. Removing the income test encourages work among severely disabled households and raises welfare in every group, but at a fiscal cost, whereas reducing the maximum payment encourages employment and lowers expenditure but reduces welfare in every group. Our findings show that tighter eligibility need not promote employment and can reduce income protection against disability-related earnings losses.