Chengcheng Wang

University of Arizona · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Differentially Private Market Segmentation

Access to consumer data enables firms to segment markets and charge different prices, but the use of such data raises privacy concerns. This paper studies a monopoly market in which information used for pricing must satisfy differential privacy, a restriction on the likelihood ratio of any disclosed message across consumer valuations. We characterize the attainable combinations of consumer and producer surplus. Relative to unrestricted disclosure, differential privacy can lower the maximum attainable consumer surplus by restricting information that supports lower prices that benefit some consumers, while the minimum attainable producer surplus remains equal to the uniform monopoly profit. Sufficiently strict privacy permits only uniform monopoly pricing, eliminating consumers' gains from segmentation. Protecting consumer data therefore need not improve consumer welfare when we consider only its effects on market outcomes.