Randy Hill

University of Arizona · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Behavioral & Experimental, Political Economy

Job market paper

Theft, Trade and Social Order

What happens in a world without institutions that protect property rights? Hobbes predicted a war of all against all in which the incentive to produce withers. I model a production economy without external protection of property as a class of games in which individuals can trade or seize others’ output by force. Familiar behaviors that govern a market emerge, even when the market is absent. In every subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals allocate productive labor as if jointly optimizing, equalize the return to labor across all goods, and gain nothing from isolation. The threat of theft extends the law of one price beyond markets: an implicit price of power is common to markets, conflicts, and isolated players. What does not survive is the market’s distribution of payoffs. In every equilibrium, each player’s share of aggregate utility equals her power, her share of the economy’s security, exactly as in universal conflict. Trade occurs only when market shares happen to coincide with power. Even under peaceful trade, every player arms as if she expected to fight. Disarmament and coordination within coalitions could make everyone better off, but some player can always do better still through force.