Christopher Almacen

Arizona State University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Health

Job market paper

Incentivizing Exploration and Stopping

We study a dynamic principal-agent problem where a principal seeks to acquire information about a project with uncertain returns and contracts with an agent to conduct the experiments. While the principal (she) commits to flexibly designing the experiments and rewards, the agent (he) can stop at any time and is constrained by his technology, which limits how much information he can generate. We show that there exists a simple optimal contract: the principal acquires information via breakthroughs, offers a deterministic and nondecreasing transfer schedule over time, and recommends stopping after any breakthrough realization. This result is driven by the players' exponential discounting and differing risk-attitudes over money. Moreover, it provides a theoretical foundation for restricting attention to a simple class of contracts.