Martín Grunwald

Arizona State University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization, Political Economy

Job market paper

Pre-Match Investment in Knowledge-Based Hierarchies

This paper studies how individuals' education choices interact with the organization of firms. Agents that differ in ability decide whether to undertake a costly, risky investment in education before sorting into occupations as workers or managers. Managers match with workers to form firms, helping them produce. Crucially, education choices depend on expected earnings, which, in turn, are shaped by aggregate education decisions through the occupational sorting and matching they induce. We show the equilibrium is unique and derive comparative statics. Although the effects are a priori ambiguous, we provide a condition for signing the effects of lower costs of managerial help, and show when this can lead to less investment. Lower education costs, however, unambiguously increase investment, raising wages, lowering rents, and reallocating employment towards larger firms. On the other hand, improvements in the distribution of education outcomes can lead to a decrease in equilibrium investment. Even when fewer agents invest, wages rise for a positive mass of workers.