Elaine Shen

University of California, Berkeley · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Finance, Health, Behavioral & Experimental

Job market paper

The Price of “Free” Advice: Measuring Agency Problems in the Insurance Broker Market

Governments often rely on private intermediaries to help people navigate complex public programs, but the very information frictions that make advice valuable can also prevent consumers from evaluating advice quality. We study how commissions, information frictions, and competitive pressure shape agency problems in Medicare, a public health insurance program serving 70 million seniors and people with disabilities. In a large-scale audit study, we hire senior "secret shoppers" to make 637 calls to randomly assigned brokers, generating a dataset of 1,692 recommendations. Brokers steer seniors toward higher-commission plans on 52% of calls. Dominated recommendations carry a 29% markup, costing seniors $377 per year and over $12,000 in present-value lifetime wealth. Advice is driven by incentives and information frictions: when a natural experiment eliminates broker pay, steering to the high-commission plan that does not match senior preferences falls by 47%, but does not fall to zero. A randomly assigned treatment designed to increase perceived competition causes brokers to recommend lower-priced plans, increasing consumer surplus when plans are homogeneous, but decreasing it when plans differ in coverage. A structural model of broker advice shows that supply-side reforms, such as equalizing commissions and capping premium markups, generate larger consumer surplus gains than changes to consumer search. The findings show that competitive pressure can shift recommendations in complex markets without aligning them with consumer interests, highlighting the importance of well-designed intermediary incentives.