Chiara Motta

Berkeley Haas · Business and Public Policy · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Urban & Regional, International

Job market paper

Can Place-Based Subsidies Improve Labor Market Efficiency?

Governments spend heavily on place-based subsidies on the premise that local labor is underutilized, yet subsidizing job creation is generally perceived as distortionary. We explore labor rationing—an excess supply of workers willing to work at prevailing wages—as an understudied source of efficiency gains for such policies. In a large regional investment subsidy program in Italy, we combine application records, longitudinal firm data, matched employer–employee data, and contractual wage floors to exploit the program's allocation rules at two levels. At the micro level, a regression discontinuity shows that subsidized firms expand employment with little change in average wages, except for workers paid above their contractual minima. At the market level, a recentered instrument yields no detectable wage increases or employment losses at competing firms and no change in worker mobility across labor markets. Together, these findings are consistent with employment rationing at contractual wage floors. We estimate that the efficiency gains from easing labor rationing offset 56 to 62 percent of the cost of financing the grants. Including firm owners' valuation, the marginal value of public funds is about 1.1 and falls to about 0.9 after accounting for investment distortions. Workers capture only 6 to 8 percent of the program's value.