Ming-yen Ho

Berkeley Haas · Business and Public Policy · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Political Economy, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Picking Winners or Building Them? Central and Local Government Venture Capital in Chinese Semiconductors

Could governments be good venture capitalists? I compare Chinese semiconductor firms backed by local government, central government, and private venture capital (VC). Central and private VCs invest in the most productive firms, while local VCs back smaller, less productive local champions. Yet local-backed firms gain about 34% in revenue productivity after investment relative to not-yet-invested firms, while central- and private-backed firms show no detectable change. Local VCs hold smaller portfolios than central VCs, sit closer to their firms, and add directors with graduate degrees and foreign education. In a model of VC selection, firm productivity, capital responses, and import competition, 2023 domestic sales would have been 11.6% lower had private VCs allocated government VCs' deals and 4.0% lower had the central government allocated local investments. Post-investment productivity growth from local government VCs outweighs the selection of central and private VCs on larger, more efficient firms.