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Theory, Behavioral & Experimental, Econometrics
Job market paper
How Trust Supports the Spread of Disinformation
In this paper, we challenge the notion that people's rationality protects them from being deceived by disinformation. Through a cheap talk framework, we find that an information designer can successfully deceive a rational receiver through strategically designed messages, even if the receiver is not interacting with others or under the influence of an echo chamber. A decision-maker must choose between two actions for which she has no particular preference. Her goal is to pick the action that aligns with the true state of the world, based on her beliefs about the two possible states. She receives a message from a sender whose type (i.e., preference over the two actions) is unknown. The sender has some private information on the state of the world, but it's based only on a noisy signal. We define the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this sender-receiver game and formulate the optimal strategies for the sender to manipulate the receiver's beliefs. Our model predicts that a high enough proportion of truthful senders in society allows deceptive information spreaders to consistently mislead the receiver, and that greater uncertainty in the world makes the receiver more willing to accept potentially deceptive information. We test these predictions experimentally using LLM agents. The results show that malicious senders ("Bad senders") are capable of systematically influencing receiver beliefs, yet they also exhibit strong over-communication behaviors. In roughly half of the observed cases, Bad senders choose truth-telling or sending no message instead of deception, despite the model's prediction that lying should always be optimal. This suggests that the moral costs of lying significantly constrain the spread of disinformation. Moreover, the greater prevalence of silence compared to truth-telling suggests that the decision to withhold communication may serve as a more effective safeguard against disinformation than previously recognized.