Daniele Mauriello

University of Bonn · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Behavioral & Experimental, Applied Micro

Job market paper

Motivated Beliefs, Not Motivated Representations

This paper studies whether motivated reasoning operates through the choice of mental representation: do people adopt the representation of a problem that licenses more favourable beliefs? In the proposed framework, individuals choose among representations, trading off the motivated value of the beliefs each one licenses against its defensibility. When a heuristic provides a defensible alternative to the rational representation, the framework predicts that individuals adopt the heuristic or the rational representation depending on which one licenses the favoured conclusion. These predictions are tested across three datasets: data from Exley and Kessler (2024) and two pre-registered online experiments (N1 = 1,212, N2 = 762). In none of the three datasets does the motive move individuals towards the representation that licenses the most favourable conclusion, and in neither experiment does the joint effect of the motive and the heuristic robustly depart from the sum of their individual effects. Heuristics thus do not provide a convenient justification for holding favourable beliefs, and motives are no cure for heuristic reasoning.