Yufeng Shi

Boston College · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Theory, Behavioral & Experimental

Job market paper

One Child Policy and Marriage Market Outcomes

This paper examines how pecuniary penalties under China’s One-Child Policy (OCP) affected female educational attainment by changing expected marriage market gains. OCP fines on second and subsequent births increase the relative marriage market value of older women, encouraging delayed entry to capture greater labor market returns. However, because delayed entry creates unbalanced trade-offs between labor market gains and marriage timing across education levels, its net effect on schooling investments is theoretically ambiguous. We formalize this mechanism using an overlapping generations model with transferable utility where forward-looking women choose schooling and entry timing. Methodologically, we overcome the unobservability of early-stage single rates and test a novel co-movement condition that identifies directional shifts in expected marriage market returns with the National Population Census of China and newly constructed provincial OCP fine data. Among those affected (i.e., urban Han women), an increase in average expected OCP fines equivalent to one year of household income between ages 6 and 20 increases the probability of high school completion by more than 10 percentage points, whereas showing no significant placebo effect for rural counterparts facing weaker fertility constraints. Concurrently, it widens the later-stage matching probability gap between high school graduates and non-graduates by approximately 5 percentage points, translating into an expanding advantage in expected marriage gains for graduates. Our findings demonstrate that fertility-reducing policies shape female human capital accumulation not only by altering reproductive expectations, but also by reallocating gains within the marriage market.