Chieh-Hsuan Hu

Boston University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Public, Applied Micro

Job market paper

Monopsony Bargaining and Market Structure in Major Defense Procurement

This paper studies how defense procurement regulation shapes market structure and procurement spending. Restrictive negotiation rules allow the Department of Defense (DoD) to cap a winning supplier’s markup using competing offers. This lowers payments for a given set of suppliers, but it also lowers firms’ expected profits and may discourage entry. I develop a two-stage structural model, where firms decide whether to supply each product market first and then bargain bilaterally with the DoD, subject to a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) constraint that captures these procurement rules. Using novel data on 23,526 contracts for major defense systems across 85 product categories (FY1989–2019), I estimate the model and simulate counterfactual procurement rules. Without the TIOLI constraint, procurement spending rises by 117%. Additional entry recovers only 8-12% of the DoD’s lost surplus, leaving its surplus 70% lower than baseline. Replacing negotiation with an English auction lowers the DoD's surplus by less than 1% and leaves entry nearly unchanged. My results suggest that current negotiation rules for the DoD perform better than unconstrained bilateral negotiation and at least as well as an auction.