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Learning about the Self in a Discrete Environment
This paper studies a Bayesian agent who learns about the precision of his own private signal rather than an external fundamental. Each period, he observes a private signal that is informative about an external state and decides whether to invest. The precision is unknown, and the agent's belief regarding it is his confidence: a more confident agent believes that his signal is more likely to be precise. The state is drawn i.i.d. in each period according to a fundamental parameter referred to as optimism, which captures how likely the drawn state is to favor investment. The learning process is determined by actions: investment reveals the state and the agent actively learns from whether the signal matched it, whereas without investment, he can still learn passively from the signal realization alone. Passive learning provides less information about signal precision than active learning and is therefore slower. I show that whenever confidence is pivotal for future investment decisions, the agent may rationally experiment by investing at an expected current loss. Under a correctly specified prior, learning converges to the truth almost surely and welfare achieves the first best in the limit. Experimentation accelerates this process. Under a misspecified prior, however, learning can lead to a suboptimal policy and result in persistent welfare loss. Experimentation can push confidence toward the wrong policy and exacerbate the welfare loss.