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Industrial Organization, Health
Job market paper
Upstream Overlap and Downstream Airline Competition
Competing airlines often purchase flight operations from the same regional carrier. I study how these shared suppliers affect airlines’ ability to sustain cooperative pricing through production costs and information about rivals’ costs. Using U.S. domestic airline data for 1998–2016, I document higher fares and smaller fare gaps between rivals with greater common subcontracting. To separate these channels, I use estimated demand and marginal costs to compare sustainable pricing outcomes under different cost and monitoring conditions. Shared suppliers can improve monitoring by providing information about the costs underlying rivals’ fares. Holding monitoring fixed, the fitted cost increases associated with common subcontracting also support greater cooperation by reducing deviation gains relative to the profits lost under punishment. Better monitoring matters most when carriers are less patient and initial detection is weak. In a simulation of the American Airlines–US Airways merger, favorable inheritance of the parents’ quality and productivity generates consumer gains. Accounting for shared suppliers changes the magnitude of these gains because production and information affect pricing incentives both before and after the merger.