Luis Henrique Ribeiro Linhares

Boston University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization, Behavioral & Experimental

Job market paper

Strategic Obfuscation: Influence Through Information Costs

We develop a model of strategic obfuscation in which an interested party (the Obfuscator) chooses the cost for a rationally inattentive decision-maker (the Learner) to process information. We characterize when the Obfuscator chooses full transparency, full obfuscation, or partial obfuscation. Endogenous information costs can lead to a counterintuitive implication: increasing the Learner's cost of mistakes can improve her resulting welfare as it leads the Obfuscator to favor more transparency. The framework links persuasion and rational inattention, shifting attention from commitment in disclosure to the design of information costs. The model helps explain fine print and product complexity and has implications for disclosure and transparency policy.