Panos Vorgias

Boston University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Applied Micro, Innovation, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Directing Innovation through Ownership Rights: Evidence on Private Returns vs. Social Spillovers

This paper studies how the allocation of intellectual-property rights over publicly funded inventions shapes the direction of private innovation and the diffusion of technological knowledge. I exploit the 1983 Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, which expanded contractors' ability to retain ownership of future federally funded inventions while leaving the underlying research funding mechanism largely unchanged. Using a matched difference-in-differences design at the firm–technology level, I find that stronger contractor ownership reduced cross-technology spillovers by approximately 25–30 percent, lowered the share of technologically similar follow-on innovation occurring outside the originating firm, and increased private patent market value by 30–40 percent. The findings document a tradeoff between private returns and social spillovers: stronger contractor ownership shifts innovation toward inventions with greater private value but narrower external technological influence. They identify ownership allocation as an important innovation-policy instrument for shaping this tradeoff, affecting not only firms' incentives to innovate but also the social reach of the innovations they choose to pursue.