Shengqi Ni

Boston University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Applied Micro, Industrial Organization, Political Economy, Development

Job market paper

Career Incentives and Performance Falsification

In organizations where multiple agents compete for promotion, individuals often engage in behaviors that enhance their promotion prospects without contributing to actual output. This paper develops a tournament model in which agents compete by choosing between productive effort and performance falsification. Agents vary in career lengths and costs of effort. The model predicts that agents with longer remaining careers exert more effort and falsify more, while those with lower costs engage in less falsification. Applying this model to GDP growth data from 282 Chinese prefecture-level cities, I successfully explain the following empirical patterns: younger politicians, who face stronger career incentives but lower development costs, yield higher real economic growth and engage in less falsification. Within individuals, falsification decreases as the career horizon shortens. These results suggest that whether promotion tournaments achieve positive selection depends on the alignment between career incentive strength and the cost of real effort.