Rufat Ismayilov

Berlin School of Economics · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Information Design in Supply Chains with Priority Suppliers

This paper studies the information design problem of a retailer facing two upstream suppliers to whom it can privately disclose information about market demand. One supplier holds priority in fulfilling orders, while the other serves as a backup. The retailer seeks to minimize expected lost-sales costs, whereas suppliers minimize the sum of lost-sales and excess-inventory holding costs. We model the interaction between the retailer and suppliers using a Bayesian persuasion framework in which the retailer commits ex ante to an information disclosure policy and privately sends demand signals to each supplier, who then chooses production quantities. Our main finding is that asymmetric disclosure characterizes the retailer's optimal policy. Specifically, the retailer strategically favors the lower-priority supplier by providing more informative signals, while keeping the higher-priority supplier relatively less informed. This result relies on very mild assumptions on demand and remains robust to heterogeneous critical ratios and alternative procurement rules. Our results highlight that the value of information sharing depends critically on how disclosure policies interact with procurement structures. In priority sourcing environments, selectively informing lower-priority suppliers can be more effective than uniformly sharing information across suppliers in reducing the retailer's expected shortage costs.