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Political Economy, Theory
Job market paper
Bureaucratic Rumours and Policymaking
This paper studies whether bureaucrats can constrain political leaders even when they lack formal policymaking authority. I develop a model in which bureaucrats learn about a proposed policy before citizens and can communicate this information informally before the policy is enacted. Citizens can block the policy either before or after enactment, but blocking becomes more costly after enactment. Bureaucratic communication affects what citizens know, the timing of citizen resistance, and which policies leaders are willing to pursue. I show that informative communication can shift resistance to the pre-enactment stage and deter extreme policies altogether when bureaucrats credibly reveal them. However, greater credibility does not always translate into stronger deterrence of extreme policies. When bureaucratic communication is partially credible, occasional warnings about an extreme policy make the absence of such a warning more reassuring. Citizens then resist less aggressively, and the leader responds by attempting extreme policies more often. As a result, more informative bureaucratic communication can increase extreme policy attempts and reduce citizen welfare.