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Environmental & Energy, Development, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
What limits electricity access? Experimental evidence from an informal market
Over half of grid-connected households in urban Benin buy electricity from their neighbors rather than the utility. This informal market has emerged to offer the opposite of the utility's single, regulated price schedule: a low connection fee and a high marginal price. What does this market reveal about how much the utility's schedule limits electricity access and welfare? We design a field experiment with over 4,000 households that randomizes subsidies to connection fees and to formal and informal marginal prices. The experiment generates price variation to estimate not only household demand for electricity but also informal supply because informal resellers are themselves formally connected. Experimental estimates show that the informal market electrifies households with lower electricity demand, and subsidized formal electricity makes formal households 114 percent more likely to start reselling. We use the experimental price variation to estimate an equilibrium model of electricity demand and informal supply. The model implies that the share of unelectrified households would nearly double, from 23 to 40 percent, without the alternative price schedule that informal resellers provide. These losses are concentrated among less wealthy households. The findings point to a new explanation for why expanding electricity access remains difficult: a rigid and regulated price schedule.