Max Maydanchik

University of Chicago · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Environmental & Energy, Public

Job market paper

Salesforce Competition in Residential Solar

Does selling bring new households into the market, or steal business from rivals? Using data on residential solar installations, a novel registry of salespeople, and utility billing records, I estimate an equilibrium model of California's solar market in which installers set prices and hire salespeople. I find evidence of both effects: salespeople raise installations by 17 percent, but the marginal salesperson brings few new households into solar and pays for itself only by taking sales from rivals. Salesforces that maximized joint industry profits would be 55 percent smaller but install only 4 percent fewer systems. Salespeople also shift sales toward installers with higher costs and markups. Most households that salespeople bring in gain financially with a typical solar loan, but 86 percent would lose money at the higher borrowing rates that concern regulators. Whether salespeople raise social welfare depends on how much subsidies cost relative to the environmental benefits of solar. Under net metering, they lower it. Under less generous net billing, as California recently implemented, and a higher social cost of carbon, they raise it, but the households they bring in earn lower financial returns.