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Competing Through Patent Litigation: Product-Market Targeting and Innovation
Patent litigation is intended to protect technology against infringement, but does the decision to sue depend only on whether infringement occurs or also on how closely the firms compete in the product market? This paper studies patent litigation as a margin of product-market competition. A simple model predicts that the propensity to sue and the resources committed to litigation increase with the contested market position, which rises with the firms’ product-market proximity. I test these predictions using the universe of U.S. patent suits between operating firms and introduce two new measures. Product-market proximity is measured from workforce skills, while litigation effort is constructed from court dockets and attorney billing records. I find that firms reduce enforcement when patents are weakened while underlying technological activity remains stable. Conditional on measures of infringement risk, patentees disproportionately target their closest product-market rivals and fight these cases harder, though plaintiffs are no more likely to win. Following a suit, the enforcer’s closer rivals produce fewer breakthrough patents even when they are not directly sued. Taken together, these results identify a competitive-targeting channel through which product-market rivalry shapes patent enforcement and innovation.