Website CV Paper
Fields
Theory, Behavioral & Experimental
Job market paper
Heterogeneous Interpretations and Collective Decisions under Model Persuasion
We study a model persuasion problem in a voting environment with heterogeneous default models and a common prior p ∈ (0, 1/2). A politician commits to a public menu of models before a common signal is realized. Voters select the best-fitting model from the menu and their own default, then vote according to its posterior. We characterize signal-specific support capacities and the weakly attainable joint support region. When p ≥ 1/4, one menu attains both capacities. Below 1/4, every nonempty menu leaves zero support after at least one signal, while silence preserves baseline support. We then characterize the politician’s optimal response and the planner’s optimal voting thresholds. When both capacities are below one, screening improves on rejection precisely when favorable evidence makes approval strictly preferable to rejection and its support capacity exceeds that of unfavorable evidence. Full capacity can prevent the planner from blocking passage. In a mixture-default application, mean-preserving dispersion can create approval opportunities or restore the planner’s ability to block passage, depending on the prior. These changes can improve welfare even under symmetric dispersion, which cannot reverse the capacity ranking.