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Macroeconomics, Development
Job market paper
The Aggregate Effects of Enforcing Labor Regulations
Labor regulations and their enforcement are traditionally viewed as contributing to lower employment in the formal sector. However, when labor markets are imperfectly competitive, enforcing regulations can lead to increased hiring. This paper builds a quantitative general equilibrium model to analyze how the endogenous enforcement of labor regulations interacts with markdowns in a monopsonistic labor market. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from Peru's labor inspection agency along with labor market microdata. We then quantify the effect of enforcement on aggregate outcomes. Relative to a world without enforcement, status quo enforcement slightly worsens misallocation, while perfect enforcement sharply reduces formal employment and lowers welfare by 17% of worker income. Welfare has an inverted U-shape in enforcement intensity and peaks when the cost to workers of filing a complaint is a third of its level in the status quo. Ultimately, the aggregate effects of labor regulations depend on the enforcement regime, not just on the regulations themselves.