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Industrial Organization, Environmental & Energy
Job market paper
Barriers to industrial growth and long-run productive efficiency: the role of policy-induced misallocation
We study how government-created distortions in upstream coal markets affect capacity investment and productivity in India's electricity industry. The government coal monopoly allocates subsidized coal preferentially to inefficient state-owned plants while forcing efficient private generators to purchase coal at market prices often about two times higher. This unequal access distorts not only the allocation of electricity production today, but also incentives to invest in new generating capacity. Using plant-level data for 2006-2017 and detailed administrative records of coal supply contracts, we estimate a dynamic oligopoly model of capacity investment for coal-fired generators and study two counterfactuals. First, raising private domestic coal access to two public benchmarks increases 2006-2009 investment by 1.7 − 4.9%, has little effect on aggregate investment, but reallocates production toward more efficient generators. Second, we incentivize early investment by offering the higher public benchmark to 2006-2009 private investments only. This raises 2006-2009 investment by 17.0% and aggregate investment by 1.8%. Because capacity arrives when shortages are severe, the policy reduces unmet demand by 3.7 TWh annually and, at our central shortage valuation, raises welfare net of investment costs by INR 175 billion annually.