Maya Norman

Columbia SIPA · Sustainable Development · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Environmental & Energy, Applied Micro, Industrial Organization

Job market paper

Develop or Conserve? How the U.S. Government Allocates Public Lands

The federal government owns half of the Western United States. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the largest federal land manager, delegates land-use decisions to 175 geographically dispersed field offices. These offices determine where mineral development, which generates billions in public revenue annually, can proceed and where development is restricted to conserve one of the world's largest intact landscapes. Federal law dictates that field offices (i) make decisions to maximize federal land's market and non-market resource values, and (ii) publicly justify their choices to stakeholders. However, field offices maintain significant discretion in how to value non-market resources and how to reconcile competing demands from conservation and industry stakeholders. This paper studies how field offices decide where to allow development and where to conserve. I show that these decisions can be modeled as collections of discrete choices and use this framework to transform 90,000 pages of planning records across 11 field offices into data suitable for discrete-choice econometric methods. I then estimate how much revenue each office forgoes to (i) conserve non-market resources and (ii) follow established conservation standards rather than justify departing from them to stakeholders. I find that the median office is willing to forgo $60,000 in annual revenue to conserve one acre, with substantial variation across offices and non-market resources. Suggestive evidence indicates that differences in local preferences better explain this heterogeneity than differences in environmental damages from development. Preferences for established standards also shape offices' choices; in seven out of ten decisions, the median office favors adherence to a standard over maximizing net resource benefits. Finally, counterfactual analyses show that recommendations for specific conservation practices, which leverage offices' preferences for established standards, can achieve the same aggregate conservation gains as price-like instruments at comparable cost, while offering implementation advantages.