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Industrial Organization, Environmental & Energy, Health, Innovation
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Hidden Violations or Costly Self-Reporting: Drinking Water Utilities’ Mandatory Self-Reporting and Water Pollution
I study regulatory monitoring through self-reporting in the context of environmental pollution. Common regulatory regimes require regulated entities to self-report their compliance. I show that since self-reporting is costly and a regulatory violation can be concealed by not self-reporting, regulated entities have an incentive to reduce how much they self-report. In pollution regulation, likely violators are commonly required to self-report relatively more often. I show that such regimes have misaligned incentives, in which the most likely violators face larger costs due to relatively more frequent self-reporting and greater incentives to shirk self-reporting in order to avoid those costs. I document mandatory water pollution self-reporting from U.S. drinking water utilities after exposure to water pollution from coal mining. I show that coal mining increases water pollution and the costs of self-reporting. I use an instrumental variable to show that coal mining causes utilities to reduce self-reporting by three to four percentage points and that they do so to save costs rather than to hide violations. Regulators increase inspections at affected utilities by two percentage points, partly to compensate for the reduction in self-reporting.