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International, Development, Applied Micro, Labor, Health
Job market paper
Employer Quality and Information Frictions in Informal Labor Markets
Informal labor markets in developing countries are infamous for poor working conditions, ranging from delayed payments to verbal abuse. Why do poor quality employers persist in informal labor markets? This paper studies the role of information frictions in sustaining low quality employment relationships in spot labor markets in India. Using field experiments with 431 casual construction workers in Chennai, I first show that workers place substantial value on employer quality, including respectful treatment, timely payment, and not being cheated. Workers demand an average premium of INR 352, approximately 32 percent of daily wages, to work for a lower-rated employer, despite facing a meaningful risk of not finding work on a given day. I then demonstrate that information about employer misconduct diffuses poorly among workers in this tightly knit labor market where workers and employers meet every day. I find that negative employer experiences are significantly less likely to be shared than positive ones, particularly when the identity of the person sharing information is revealed. Mechanism experiments offer suggestive evidence that fear of employer retaliation and concerns about the signal strength of individual experiences may play a role in limiting the transmission of negative information. These findings demonstrate the limitation of reputation as a disciplining mechanism for employer behavior even when formal enforcement is absent.