Yurou He

Cornell Dyson School · Applied Economics and Management · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Environmental & Energy, Urban & Regional, Theory

Job market paper

Land Assembly: Outsider Bargaining with a Network

Assembling complementary assets from multiple owners is common in economic activities but often leads to severe holdout problems. This paper uses land assembly as a concrete context to study how asset networks and bargaining order affect assembly success and surplus division. I develop a sequential bargaining model on a land parcel network and introduce pivotality and assembly centrality to characterize bargaining positions of landowners. The model predicts that pivotal owners can extract significant surplus; acquisition order also matters: purchasing peripheral parcels first can improve bargaining positions of remaining central owners by reducing alternative assembly options. Using over 570,000 parcel transactions in U.S. land assembly projects from 2007--2022, I find that an additional pivotal parcel nearly doubles the average parcel price of an assembly project; more central parcels sell for higher prices when purchased later in the sequence. The price effect of pivotality is greater in states with stronger restrictions on eminent domain.