Website CV Paper
Fields
Labor, Behavioral & Experimental, Applied Micro
Job market paper
How Much are Candidates Willing to Pay for More Openings and Higher Chances of Getting the Job? Evidence from Civil Service Exams
I document that job seekers have intrinsic preferences over the competitiveness of getting the job positions they apply for in a high-stakes, real-world setting. I do this by leveraging a unique natural setting in Brazil where job applicants apply for government positions using a Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. Because the algorithm is incentive compatible, applicants' rankings of positions should reflect the positions' competitiveness only through their true preferences. I estimate these preferences using two measures: the probability that each candidate is matched with a certain job and the number of openings available for a particular position. My estimates imply that high-performing candidates are willing to pay, on average, 3.6 to 5.7 percent of the earnings provided by a job posting to increase their matching probability by 10 percentage points and 0.2 to 2.3 percent to have 10 additional openings in a job posting. These results suggest that application procedures reveal a desire to avoid competitive job positions not only due to application costs, but also because individuals have direct preferences over the difficulty of obtaining a job.