Saloni Vadeyar

Cornell University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Development, Labor, Applied Micro

Job market paper

Gambling for Ascension: The Quest for Elite Government Jobs in India

Each year, over one million graduates in India take the Civil Services Examination competing for approximately 1,000 vacancies. Why do aspirants spend years preparing for these examinations—remaining unemployed and forgoing labor-market opportunities—despite success rates as low as 0.1%? Using original survey data on 1,643 aspirants and two randomized discrete choice experiments, this paper investigates this puzzle. The first experiment estimates valuations of three non-pecuniary attributes of elite government jobs: tenure, social status, and power, with the latter two characterized using aspirants' own perceptions elicited through structured interviews. The second experiment elicits choices between private-sector careers and lotteries over government employment. Combined with a structural lifetime-utility model, it identifies risk preferences and valuations of elite civil service positions. Under expected utility, aspirants exhibit strong risk-seeking and assign a very high value to the government job. Under probability weighting, they substantially overweight small probabilities, with extremely large decision weights but still assigning a very high value to the job. These findings suggest extreme probability insensitivity and maximax-like preferences: aspirants largely discount the odds and costs of failure, focusing instead on the prospect of obtaining an elite position. High valuations of non-wage attributes, recovered from both the job-choice experiments and the structural model, help explain why civil service employment is perceived as a jackpot.