Website CV Paper
Fields
Applied Micro, Industrial Organization, Innovation
Job market paper
Lobbying for Innovation? Evidence from Revolving-Door Connections in Defense R&D
Firms can exert influence over the congressional appropriations process that funds the R&D they perform. I study how lobbying directed at this process affects the allocation and innovation outcomes of publicly funded R&D. To answer this question, I build a novel dataset of late-stage R&D projects funded by the U.S. Department of Defense from 2004 to 2023 that records their funding, milestones, and their outcomes (successful completion or termination), linked to the lobbying activities of the firms that perform those R&D projects. To address the endogeneity of lobbying, I exploit revolving-door connections: a firm gains political access to a defense appropriator’s office when that office hires a former congressional coworker of a lobbyist at one of the firm’s lobbying shops. Within four years of gaining this access, the share of years in which firms lobby rises by 23 percentage points, Congress appropriates 17 percent more funding for their projects, and the share of their projects terminated by the Department of Defense falls by 70 percent. But their projects achieve no more milestones than before, and the share that reaches successful completion does not rise. Political access thus increases funding and prolongs development without advancing it, a pattern consistent with a rent-seeking view of lobbying.