Tirza Angerhofer

Duke University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Labor

Job market paper

Dynamic Oligopsony and Labor Market Entry: The Case of Danish Pharmaceuticals

Large firms have wage-setting power over their current workforce, but the need to ensure reliable inflows of new workers constrains that power. This tension is particularly important in markets with specialized human capital, where trained workers are captive, but wage-sensitive prospective workers can choose whether to train. We develop a dynamic oligopsony model in which large firms internalize how the wages they pay shape the future supply of trained workers to their sector, extending standard monopsony models that study firms' short-run market power over a fixed pool of workers. Estimating the model on the Danish pharmacist labor market from 2001 to 2019, we show that relative to a myopic benchmark where firms maximize short-run profits, firms increase wages by $2,472 and reduce markdowns by 12.5% when they account for entry. However, accounting for entry only closes the employment gap relative to the competitive benchmark by 16.3%. Because the trained labor pool is shared across firms, investment is primarily undertaken by large firms in concentrated markets — the same firms and markets where monopsony distortions are greatest. In our counterfactuals, we show that entrant wage subsidies offered by individual firms or an employer organization expand future supply, improving the allocation of workers across sectors, but result in lower wages for the incumbent workforce.