Website CV Paper
Fields
Industrial Organization, Health
Job market paper
Market Design with Intermediaries: Evidence from US Liver Transplants
Many designed markets rely on intermediaries to allocate scarce resources. I study how transplant centers' incentives and private information shape deceased-donor liver allocation. Donor livers are offered to patients according to centralized priority lists, but transplant centers screen candidates and accept offers on their behalf. Using nationwide administrative data, I document that center competition affects both patient screening and offer acceptance decisions, and I estimate a game of incomplete information among centers. My estimates show that in 10% of transplants, centers bypass the highest-ranked patient who would benefit in favor of another patient. Centers possess valuable private information about transplant suitability, but rigid allocation rules limit its use. Allowing the nearest center to choose the recipient of each organ would increase the value of transplants by 8.3% and reduce one-year graft failure or death by 26.8% (from a baseline of 8.25%), partly by directing organs to less urgent patients. Other flexible designs can improve transplant value while preserving priority for urgent patients.