Zhaosheng Li

Duke University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, Labor, Innovation, Econometrics, Political Economy

Job market paper

Monopsony, Unemployment, and Optimal Policy

How does employer concentration affect unemployment, and how should unemployment insurance respond? I develop a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model in which a finite number of large employers hire strategically: each firm's hiring changes current recruiting conditions, the future unemployment pool, and rivals' future hiring, and bargaining passes these effects into wages. In a calibrated distribution of local labor markets, replacing large employers with atomistic ones lowers unemployment from 6.0 to 5.5 percent and raises worker income excluding profits by 4.3 percent, but aggregate welfare falls slightly because atomistic multiworker firms overhire through wage dilution in bargaining. Because large employers internalize part of the congestion their vacancies create, the Hosios condition depends on market structure: efficiency requires less worker bargaining power in more concentrated markets. With risk aversion and endogenous search, whether concentrated markets call for more or less generous UI depends on the share of profits workers receive through firm ownership or profit-tax rebates.