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Macroeconomics, Finance
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Who Bears the Burden of Bank Capital Regulation? Buffers, Risk Weights, and the Supply of Credit
Who bears the burden of bank capital regulation? Using narratively identified capital-requirement shocks and a quarterly panel of U.S. banks (1994–2019), we document two cross-sectional facts: within banks, commercial lending contracts more than real estate lending, reflecting differential risk weights; across banks, institutions with thin voluntary buffers cut lending most. The buffer gradient extends well beyond the two percent of bank-quarters at the regulatory frontier—which a capital constraint alone cannot produce—and so identifies a cost of regulatory capital that is not risk-weighted. A heterogeneous macro-banking model built on that mechanism reproduces the gradient as an untargeted moment, 1.32 against 1.32 in the data. Statutory size tiers locate the exposed banks poorly, explaining 1.8% of the cross-sectional variance in regulatory slack. Risk weights and size tiers redistribute the burden of a tightening but barely change its aggregate magnitude—a gross transition cost excluding the stability benefits of capital.