Mattia Albanese

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Labor

Job market paper

Labor Market Competition and Workplace Training

Firms underinvest in general relative to specific skills training because workers with transferable skills are more likely to be poached by competitors. This paper studies how labor market competition shapes the type and amount of training firms provide, and quantifies the implications for productivity and welfare. Using novel administrative data from the Italian Fondo Nuove Competenze, we construct a task-based, worker-level measure of the generality of firm-provided training. Comparing workers in the same firm and occupation across local labor markets, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in competition lowers training generality by about 2 percentage points (5% of the mean). We rationalize this fact with a model in which firms choose the amount and composition of training under poaching risk, and estimate it by GMM on local mobility flows and training choices. The estimated model shows that poaching risk depresses both the amount and the generality of training. Counterfactuals show that restricting worker mobility, in the spirit of non-compete agreements, raises output and welfare because lower poaching risk leads firms to train more in both general and specific skills.