Valentina D'Anna

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Education

Job market paper

Gender Hiring Quotas

Gender quotas have mostly targeted corporate boards and done little for the gender employment gap. A quota on the stock of employment would force firms to separate incumbent workers or hire beyond their needs. A quota on new hires avoids these costs, but firms can comply and then undo its effect through separations. We study a unique policy: Italian firms that win public contracts funded by the EU recovery plan must reserve for women at least 30 percent of the new hires needed for the project. Coverage depends on how contracts are funded, so similar contracts are awarded with and without the quota. Linking procurement records to employer-employee data and balance sheets, we compare winners of contracts with and without the quota in a matched difference-in-differences design. The quota raises female hires by 26 percent without changing whether firms hire. Female employment rises by 8.6 percent relative to comparable winners without the quota and keeps growing over time. Male and total employment do not change significantly, so the gender composition of the workforce shifts toward women. Female separations do not rise, and the women hired in the award year are still employed two years later. The new jobs are mostly white-collar but temporary and part-time, with no effect on wages. We find no detectable costs for firms. Hiring quotas can bring women into male-dominated firms, and firms keep the women they hire.