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Macroeconomics, Finance, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
The Unrealized Potential of a Parent's Promise: Cosigned Mortgages and Access to Credit in the United States
This paper asks how altruistic third-party guarantees shape access to credit, and why they deliver less than they could in the U.S. mortgage market. Parents can make a child's mortgage safer by cosigning, but lenders charge the solo rate, so families overpay 25 basis points. This safety does not come from the parent's information advantage. Unlike a commercial guarantor, the parent also cares about the child's gain, making her not necessarily choose the safest. This introduces adverse selection that dominates the screening. The promise more than offsets the lower cosigning pool quality, as children miss fewer payments when a parent cosigns. Underwriting acknowledges cosigning only partially on admission but not for pricing. Cosigning raises homeownership among young Americans by 0.8 percentage points. Correcting for differences in pool quality and the guarantee nearly doubles access to homeownership without introducing more defaults. It raises welfare, mostly for lower-income children. These results come from a general-equilibrium model with asymmetric information, estimated on the first U.S. measure of parental cosigning, from web-scraped deeds and administrative data.