Panagiotis Kyriazis

European University Institute · Economics · 2026–27 job market · Postdoc at European University Institute

Fields

Theory, Industrial Organization, Finance

Job market paper

Shaping the Menu: Information Design under Screening

How should consumers learn when a seller chooses a menu of product qualities and prices? The seller observes the learning policy, but not consumers' private signals. Under a cost curvature condition, every optimal learning policy for weights strictly favoring consumers sustains a continuum of differentiated products extending to efficient quality at the top, even with only two underlying valuations. The feasibility constraints on learning can make it optimal to offer an isolated basic product alongside this range or to exclude some buyers. The basic product lowers prices for higher qualities, but keeping it profitable can leave fewer buyers purchasing those qualities. Exclusion sacrifices this alternative but can allow more buyers to earn rents within the differentiated range. Maximizing consumer surplus can therefore require leaving gains from trade unrealized. Joint design of buyers' private information and a public signal—equivalently, joint design of learning and market segmentation—eliminates inefficient exclusion and can raise both consumer surplus and profit relative to buyer-optimal private learning in a single market. Even random segmentation with different learning policies and separate menus can give consumers more surplus than any single market yielding the same profit, without revealing information about valuations through segment labels. Our results highlight the power of intermediaries to influence consumers' terms of trade, making their incentives central to consumer protection.