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International, Macroeconomics, Finance
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Sovereign Risk and the Maturity of Bank Credit
This paper studies how banks adjust the maturity of credit when sovereign stress rises. I use administrative data from the Banco de Portugal that track monthly bank–firm credit relationships and the maturity of outstanding credit during the 2010–2012 European sovereign debt crisis. I exploit differences in banks’ pre-crisis exposure to distressed sovereign debt to compare lending to the same firm by banks with different exposure. I find that banks do not reduce lending proportionately across maturities. Relative to less exposed banks lending to the same firm, banks more exposed to sovereign risk cut medium- and long-term credit, while their short-term credit does not differ, so the maturity of credit shortens within continuing relationships. The contraction in medium- and long-term credit is larger for small, highly leveraged and financially constrained firms. At the firm level, firms borrowing from more exposed banks obtain less medium- and long-term credit and more short-term credit, and their total bank credit falls. They do not compensate by borrowing from other banks. Sovereign stress therefore reduces both the amount and the maturity of the bank credit available to firms.