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Political Economy, Environmental & Energy, Development
Job market paper
Political Lending over Electoral and Credit Cycles
State-owned (or public) banks allow governments to intervene in credit markets, but also give politicians discretion over credit allocation. Public lending sustains jobs and local economic activity when private credit contracts, making it particularly valuable, especially during elections. Using monthly bank–municipality data from Brazil and a triple-difference design, we find that public lending expands disproportionately in politically competitive municipalities during presidential campaigns, especially during credit contraction episodes. Effects follow exactly the electoral calendar and are stronger in smaller, more corrupt, and less educated municipalities, consistent with weaker accountability and more effective economic voting. We argue that employment is one channel through which credit translates into votes. Public-bank exposure cushions declines in firms’ net hiring around elections in competitive municipalities only, while a public bank branch-expansion program increases employment and the incumbent president’s vote share by up to 4 percentage points. Electoral lending is followed by deteriorating loan quality, implying estimated losses of $3.7 billion (0.2% of GDP) per presidential cycle. Thus, electoral incentives make public credit an instrument of state-dependent distributive politics.