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Optimal Defense Spending and Taxation in a Dynamic Economy
This paper studies optimal fiscal policy when productive capital faces destructive risk and public spending mitigates losses, using geopolitical risk and defense spending as the main application. Protection reduces potential losses but competes with investment for resources, and financing it through distortionary taxation creates additional costs. When capital income can finance protection, capital is simultaneously a productive asset, the object of protection, and a tax base used to finance its own protection. I show that the economy can adapt to greater destruction risk by reallocating resources toward both protection and investment, so capital and output therefore need not decline monotonically, even though welfare falls. A Ramsey government internalizes this interaction, relies primarily on labor taxation, and may subsidize capital accumulation during post-shock rebuilding. Under discretion, the government taxes installed capital to finance defense, distorting both capital accumulation and protection of the productive base. This protection channel amplifies the standard capital-tax distortion. In the benchmark calibration, discretion generates a consumption-equivalent welfare loss of 2.25 percent, approximately 15 percent of which is attributable to the endogenous weakening of protection. Finally, using the Geopolitical Risk Index to discipline the stochastic threat process, the model reproduces the positive response of defense spending to risk innovations.