Jae Hoon Lee

George Washington University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Macroeconomics, International, Public

Job market paper

Fiscal Rules When Sovereign Debt Is Risky but Convenient

Investors value sovereign debt for its liquidity and as collateral even when it carries default risk. This paper studies how this convenience changes the optimal design of fiscal rules in a quantitative model of sovereign default calibrated to Italy. It compares a debt brake, which caps debt, with a spread brake, which stops new borrowing once the spread exceeds a threshold. Spread brakes raise welfare more than the best debt brake: their ceilings are loose when default risk is low and tighten when it rises. But the market spread, the spread observed in bond markets, reflects not only default risk but also the convenience yield. A spread brake that reads the market spread therefore loosens when demand for liquidity and collateral rises, and it raises welfare less than a spread brake based on default risk. The gap widens in a monetary union: members earn different convenience yields, so a common market-spread threshold allows each member a different level of default risk. Spread brakes should target default risk rather than market spreads.