Andrea Neyra Nazarrett

Harvard University · Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Labor, Development

Job market paper

Effort at Work: Wage Premia, Managers, and Shirking in a Large Retailer

I study managerial monitoring and wage premia as levers to incentivize worker effort in the firm. Using administrative records from a large retailer, I show how the two jointly deter inventory shrinkage, merchandise missing from the store. Exploiting the rotation of managers across stores, I estimate each manager's effect on shrinkage and document what high-type managers do when they arrive at a store. They are not better bookkeepers. They work more shifts, including nights and weekends, spend more time on the floor with their workers, and rework the teams they inherit, yet on demographic characteristics they are indistinguishable from other managers. Leveraging a company policy that sets wages centrally by position, I document that shrinkage also falls with the wage premium. The two levers reinforce each other: the arrival of a good manager reduces shrinkage by 8 percent more where the premium is high. Good managers suspend more workers during high-wage-premium periods.