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Economic History, Political Economy, Industrial Organization
Job market paper
Coordination and Collusion in Industrial Development
Can organizations that sustain collusion also promote growth? In a model, market power imposes static costs but can finance investment when financial frictions bind. We study this trade-off during German industrialization, when the country became a global leader in chemicals and manufacturing while legally enforceable cartels came to organize more than half of industrial output. We combine the universe of cartel contracts and court rulings on their enforceability with annual data on all joint-stock firms, input–output linkages, and industrial censuses through 1933. Using staggered cartel entry and unexpected changes in legal enforceability, we find that cartel members earned more, invested more, upgraded production, and expanded output, especially in capital-intensive industries. Cartelized inputs initially raised downstream costs, but a system of cross-sector contracts facilitated by banks and the state later mitigated these costs. In the aggregate, cartelization was associated with higher industrial employment, but also with fewer entrants, greater concentration, and lower regional income today. Our estimates and counterfactual simulations indicate that enforceable collusion promoted investment and growth under binding financial constraints, while leaving a system of coordination by contract that constrained later adjustment.