Jennifer Walsh

Harvard Business School · Business Economics · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Industrial Organization, Finance

Job market paper

Capital Regulation as a Barrier to Bank Consolidation

While thousands of mergers have reshaped the United States banking sector since the 1990s, the U.S. still has more banks per capita than all other large countries. We show that capital regulation has meaningfully depressed bank M&A activity by limiting the ability for banks to perform mergers in cash. Using a 2001 policy change in accounting standards as an instrument for the post-merger regulatory capital of target banks, we find that a standard deviation increase in capital raises the probability that a bank is purchased within a year by more than 40%. Structurally estimating a model of banks choosing merger partners subject to capital constraints, we find that weakening capital requirements around M&A since 1992 would have led to more consolidation and 19% fewer operating banks in 2022. Cost efficiencies realized from additional mergers are of similar magnitude to consumer welfare losses from lower competition in deposit and loan markets. However, pairing weakened capital requirements with additional antitrust screening would have retained most efficiencies while preserving consumer surplus.