Julian Chitiva

HEC Paris · Economics and Decision Sciences · 2026–27 job market

Fields

Theory

Job market paper

Sequential Redistribution in Networked Exchange Economies

This paper studies decentralised trade in networks through a sequence of Walrasian exchanges, each within a completely connected group. Agents have quasilinear HARA preferences with common curvature, and the groups that keep trading connect all agents. I show that each agent ends with the same amounts of non-numeraire goods as in the centralised market but, since each group trades at its own price, with a different amount of numeraire. Hence, the final allocation is Pareto efficient, and the sequence affects only the speed of convergence and the distribution of the numeraire. I obtain a closed-form approximation of this redistribution for repeated sequences and for random sequences. Finally, I show that larger groups need not accelerate convergence or reduce redistribution.